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ABSTRACT: The expression “a culture of freedom” is unmistakably modern. Yet its meaning is not 
immediately clear. My purpose in this paper is to clarify the possible meaning of this expression by 
taking Kant’s practical philosophy as a point of reference. In order to do so, I will depart from Kant’s 
explicit conception of culture, and try to relate it to his own distinction between external and internal 
freedom, especially as it appears in the Metaphysics of Morals.
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1 Except for the three Critiques, which are quoted by their initials in German (Kritik der Reinen Vernunft = KrV; 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft = KpV; Kritik der Urteilskraft = KU), the rest of Kant’s works are quoted by their 
initials in English, followed by the volume and page of the Prussian Academy edition of Kant’s Gesammelte 
Schriften. Thus, Anth.7: 342 is the Anthropology, vol. 7, page 342. To quote the Education, instead the page, it will 
be given the paragraph in the English translation. Thus, Education (9); 9: 445, refers to the paragraph 9 in the English 
edition, and the page 445 in the volume 9 in the edition of the Akkademie. 
Other abbreviations: MM: Metaphysics of Morals. TP: On the Common Saying: ‘This may be true in theory, but it 
does not apply in practice. End All Things:  The End of All Things. SBHH: Speculative Beginning of Human History. 
KrV: Critique of Pure Reason. KpV: Critique of Practical Reason. KU: Critique of the Power of Judgment. Idea: 
Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View. Religion:  Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason.  QQ; A Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: ‘Is the Human Race Continually Improving?”. GG: 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
 
I have employed the  following editions in English:  
 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view, trans.Victor Lyle Dowdell, with an introduction by Frederick P. Van 
de Pitte, ed. Hans R. Rudnick, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, Edwardsville, 1978.  
Education, trans. Annette Churton, University of Michigan Press, 1960. 
Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and edited by Mary Gregor, with an introduction by Roger J. Sullivan, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 
On the Common Saying: ‘This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice, trans. H. B. Nisbet, in Kant 
Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, Cambridge University Press, 2nd enlarged edition, 1991.  
“A Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: ‘Is the Human Race Continually Improving?”, trans. H. B. Nisbet, in 
Kant Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, Cambridge University Press, 2nd, enlarged edition, 1991.  
The End of All Things, trans.Ted Humphrey, Hacket Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1983. 
Speculative Beginning of Human History, trans.Ted Humphrey, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 
Cambridge, 1983. 
Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, trans.Ted Humphrey, Hacket Publishing Company, 
Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1983.  
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Critique of Practical Reason, trans. and edited by Mary Gregor, with an introduction by Andrews Reath, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, ed.Paul Guyer, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000.  
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. and ed. by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni, with an 
introduction by Robert Merrihew Adams, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor, with an introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
 
 2 
Kant’s explicit conception of culture involves the assimilation of “culture” to the 
“perfection of human nature”.2 This meaning, in turn, can be applied not just to the 
individual human being but also to the human species if only we adopt a higher 
perspective –that of Providence, or also that of the educators or social scientists.3 In this 
case Kant associates culture with “civilization”, whose highest achievement is precisely 
the institution of Right.    
 
The institution of Right is thought by Kant as setting the conditions for external 
freedom, just as virtue is seen as the condition of internal freedom. Thus, we could 
think of Right as defining the core of “a culture of external freedom”, and Virtue as 
defining the core of a “culture of internal freedom”, even if, as we will see below, the 
development of a culture of freedom requires the introduction of further conditions.  
 
While Kant speaks sometimes of a “moral culture”,4 he nowhere speaks of a 
“culture of right”. Nevertheless, the latter is implied in the fact that Kant himself places 
law and juridical institutions at the top of culture or civilization. More interesting, 
however, is the fact that, according to Kant, there is a gap or a lack of continuity 
between civilization –as a “culture of right”- and the so called “moral culture”, which 
stretches from pragmatic reason to moral reason.
5
 Thus, he writes in the Education: 
“We live in an age of discipline, culture and refinement, but we are still a long way of 
from the age of moral training”.6 How are we supposed to cover this insurmountable 
gap, to walk that long way, actually an abyss, from culture and refinement to morality? 
And, how does this distance affect the very notion of a culture of freedom? 
 
In my view, the detailed account of the paradoxes and problems involved in this 
notion constitutes a privileged way to show the aspirations and paradoxes of humanity. 
To that end, I begin by summarizing Kant’s distinction between external and internal 
freedom. That summary will serve as a preliminary step towards clarifying Kant’s 
notion of a “culture of right” and a “moral culture” which I outline in the following two 
                                                 
2 See Ana Marta González, La doble aproximación de Kant a la cultura, Anuario Filosófico, vol. XXXVII/3, nº 80, 2004, 
679-712. 
3 See Education (17); 8: 449. 
4 He uses the expression “moral culture” literally in the following passages:  “Moral culture must be based upon 
‘maxims’, not upon discipline; the one prevents evil habits, the other trains the mind to think”, Education (77); 9: 480; 
“Maxims ought to originate in the human being as such. In moral training we should seek early to infuse into children 
ideas as to what is right and wrong. If we wish to establish morality, we must abolish punishment”, Education (78); 9: 
481; “(physical training) aims only at nature, while moral training aims at freedom. A man may be highly cultivated 
physically, he may have a well-cultivated mind; but if he lacks moral culture, he will be a wicked man”, Education (63); 
9: 470;  “To expect not simply to train good citizens but good men who can improve and take care of themselves; to 
expect that his will eventually happen by means of education of youth in the home, then in schools on both the lowest and 
the highest level, in intellectual and moral culture fortified by religious doctrine –that is desirable, but its success is hardly 
to be hoped for”. QQ, 7: 92; “Without such confidence the wholesome gratification of enjoying moral culture within 
society and of enjoying culture itself would be denied”. Anth., 7: 279; “This tendency can be observed in the smallest 
child, because in him, starting from culture toward morality, and not (as reason dictates) from morality and its laws, 
Nature strives to establish a culture which conforms with morality. This inevitably establishes the wrong tendency which 
does not answer the purpose. For example, one would try in vain to deduct morality if religious instruction, which should 
necessarily be a moral cultivation, starts with historical, which is only memory training”. Anth., 7: 327-8.  
5 “Physical culture must, however, be distinguished from practical culture, which last is pragmatic or moral. In this last 
case morality is the aim rather than culture”. Education (63), 9:470. 
6 Education (19); 9: 451. 
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sections. Finally, I try to work out the meaning of a culture of freedom, without any 
further qualification.  
 
 
I. Kant’s distinction between external and internal freedom 
 
According to Kant, inasmuch as we take human behavior to be part of nature, it is ruled 
by the Laws of Nature. Yet, to the extent we take it as free, it is ruled by the moral law. 
The moral law is, then, a law of freedom. The Laws of Nature, on the other hand, are 
the product of our understanding whereas the moral law is originated in Reason. Thus, 
the only aspect it has in common with the Law of Nature is its universality. This is true 
of juridical and moral laws alike. At the same time, however, Kant introduces a 
distinction between juridical laws and moral laws: 
 
“As directed merely to external actions and their conformity to law they are called juridical laws; 
but if they also require that they (the laws) themselves be the determining ground of actions, they are 
ethical laws, and then one says that conformity with juridical laws is the legality of an action and 
conformity with ethical laws is its morality. The freedom to which the former laws refer can be only 
freedom in the external use of choice, but the freedom to which the latter refer is freedom in both the 
external and the internal use of choice, insofar as it is determined by laws of reason”.7 
 
In this text, it is implied that external freedom is merely a “lack of coercion”. 
External freedom is constituted by a lack of external coercion on the human person. 
Accordingly, nobody could prevent me from doing whatever I want so long as I do not 
break the juridical laws.  
 
Internal freedom also means a lack of coercion, but in a different sense, for in this 
case, the coercion to which Kant refers is internal: its origin lies not in other people, but 
in our own (empirical) nature, which prevent us from acting from reason alone. Thus, 
internal freedom, for Kant, means the capacity to act entirely from reason alone, 
without being determined by nature.  
 
Now, Kant assumes that not being determined by nature amounts to taking reason 
as the determining ground of our actions, and, thereby, acting morally well. In other 
words: good ethical behavior, for him, is identical with pure rational behavior. Reason 
is assumed to be always “right reason”. And only a rational behavior could be called 
free. 
 
While the identification of “reason” with “right reason” –as if reason would not 
need eventual rectification- is surely a rationalist heritage, it is nevertheless true that, as 
Kant puts it, “freedom can never be located in a rational subject’s being able to choose 
in opposition to his (lawgiving) reason, even though experience proves often enough 
that this happens (though we still cannot comprehend how this is possible)”.8 
 
                                                 
7 MM, 6: 220. 
8 MM, 6: 226. 
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In other words: the possibility of choosing against (right) reason is not freedom. 
The argument Kant gives is a classic one:  “only freedom in relation to the internal 
lawgiving of reason is really an ability; the possibility of deviating from it is an 
inability”.9 Indeed, the ability or the capacity to act badly is not a capacity at all. This is 
true both in arts and in morality. The capacity of singing badly is not a capacity in the 
positive sense of the term: it is rather a shortcoming. Likewise, the capacity of 
departing from the rule of reason is not a capacity, in the proper sense of the term, but a 
shortcoming: inability to determine one’s behavior by reason alone. Instead, one lets 
oneself be determined by nature, rather than by reason.  
 
This is why Kant places internal freedom in acting from duty alone.
10
 Thus, while 
external freedom depends on the lack of coercion secured by a juridical state, internal 
freedom does not depend on merely fulfilling the law. It depends rather on our fulfilling 
the law out of respect for the law. Only then are we really free from the coercion of our 
nature.  
 
This is the ground of Kant’s division of the Metaphysics of Morals in a “Doctrine 
of Right” and a “Doctrine of Virtue”.11 Thus, “ethical lawgiving (even if the duties 
might be external) is that which cannot be external; juridical lawgiving is that which 
can also be external. So it is an external duty to keep a promise made in a contract; but 
the command to do this merely because it is a duty, without regard for any other 
incentive, belongs to internal lawgiving alone”.12 
 
Now, according to this distinction, the expression “a culture freedom” could 
mean two different things. It could namely mean merely a “culture of right”, that is, a 
culture with sound legal institutions, which allow anyone to do their will as long as it 
does not collide with someone else’s freedom; or else it could also mean a “moral 
culture”, in which every one would fulfill the law out of respect for the law. At this 
point, further comment is needed: while the incentive of any moral behavior must lie 
merely in the respect for the law, and never in the ends provided by the inclinations, it 
is also the case that human actions must always have a matter and an end.
13
 This is why 
                                                 
9 MM, 6 :227. 
10 MM, 6: 219. 
11 For Kant these are “distinguished not so much by their different duties as by the difference in their lawgiving, which 
connects one incentive or the other with the law”. MM, 6: 220 
12 MM, 6: 220 
13 “Although on its own behalf morality does not need the representation of an end which would have to precede the 
determination of the will, it may well be that it has a necessary reference to such an end, not as the ground of its maxims 
but as a necessary consequence accepted in conformity to them. For in the absence of all reference to an end no 
determination of the will can take place in human beings at all, since no such determination can occur without an effect, 
and its representation, though not as the determining ground of the power of choice nor as an end that comes first in 
intention, must nonetheless be admissible as the consequence of that power’s determination to an end through the law; 
without this end, a power of choice which does not thus add to a contemplated action the thought of either an objectively 
or subjectively determined object (which it has or should have), instructed indeed as to how to operate but not as to the 
whither, can itself obtain no satisfaction. So morality really has no need of an end for right conduct; on the contrary, the 
law that contains the formal condition of the use of freedom in general suffices to it. Yet an end proceeds from morality 
just the same”. Religion, 6: 4-5 
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Kant introduces the somewhat problematic notion of “an a priori end of reason”,14 
which is the basis of the so-called “duties of virtue”.15   
 
Although he does not refer to it explicitly, it seems reasonable to think that this “a 
priori end of reason” is somehow connected to the highest good, which in the Critique 
of Practical Reason had been described as “the unconditioned totality of the object of 
pure practical reason”.16 Indeed, in the KpV Kant referred to the practical character of 
the highest good,
17
 only that at that time he was more interested in showing the 
antinomy of practical reason than in properly showing our practical contribution to the 
emergence of the highest good. It is not until the Metaphysics of Morals that he sets out 
to disclose the way we are supposed to realize the highest good, namely, through our 
virtuous actions.
18
 Accordingly, he particularizes the “ends that are also duties” in 
“one’s own perfection” and “the happiness of others”.19 
 
All this is relevant for working out the notion of a “culture of freedom”. For, if 
we take this to mean merely “external freedom”, we would be pointing at the 
realization of a merely “formal culture”; on the other hand, if we take this to mean 
“internal freedom”, it would imply not merely acting from duty, but since actions from 
duty must have a content- the commitment to realize the highest good-,
20
 it follows that 
all actions must be made under the auspices of a positive effort to advance the 
happiness of others.  
 
  
II. Kant’s culture of right 
 
Focusing on Kant’s explicit meaning of culture as “perfection of human nature”, one 
may still choose two different approaches: either a practical approach, or a naturalistic 
one. While the first, moral, approach regards man as the author or promoter of 
                                                 
14  “Since the sensible inclinations of human beings tempt them to ends that can be contrary to duty, lawgiving reason can 
in turn check their influence only by a moral end set up against the ends of inclination, an end set up against the ends of 
inclination, an end that must therefore be given a priori, independently of inclinations”. MM, 6: 381 
15 Not every ethical duty is a duty of virtue: “Setting aside the question of what sort of end is in itself a duty and how such 
an end is possible, we have here only to show that a duty of this kind is called a duty of virtue and what is called by this 
name (…) Those duties that have to do not so much with a certain end (matter, object of choice) as merely with what is 
formal in the moral determination of the will (e.g., that an action in conformity with duty must also be done from duty) are 
not duties of virtue. Only an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue”. MM, 6:383. Notice that, in this text, 
Kant speaks of an ethical duty which is not an ethical virtue nor a duty of right. 
16 KpV,  5:108 
17 “In the highest good which is practical for us, i.e., one which is to be made real by our will, virtue and happiness are 
thought of as necessarily combined, so that the one cannot be assumed by a practical reason without the other belonging to 
it”. KpV, 5: 113 
18 “It cannot be a matter of indifference to morality, therefore, whether it does or does not fashion for itself the concept of 
an ultimate end of all things (although, to be sure, harmonizing with this end does not increase the number of morality’s 
virtues but rather provides these with a special point of reference for the unification of all ends); for only in this way can 
an objective practical reality be given to the combination, which we simply cannot do without, of the purposiveness 
(deriving) from freedom and the purposiveness of nature”. Religion, 6: 5. 
19 See MM, 6: 387-388; 6: 392-394. 
20 “The doctrine of right dealt only with the formal condition of outer freedom (the consistency of outer freedom with 
itself if its maxim were made universal law), that is, with right. But ethics goes beyond this and provides a matter (an 
object of free choice), an end of pure reason which it represents as an end that is also objectively necessary, that is, an end 
that, as far as human beings are concerned, it is a duty to have”. MM, 6: 381 
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culture,
21
 the second sees man’s perfection almost as the effect of a natural process, 
which began with man’s expulsion from the garden, that is, once man abandoned the 
state of nature.
22
 I will focus on the practical approach to a “culture of right”, as it can 
be worked out from Kant’s exposition in the Metaphysics of Morals.  
 
The first thing we can expect from this practical approach is to lay down the 
principle of Right. Thus, keeping with his definition of right as “the sum of the 
conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in 
accordance with a universal law of freedom”,23 Kant states the “Universal Principle of 
Right” in the following terms: “Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of 
each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law”.24 
 
According to Kant, this principle is essentially connected with an authorization to 
use coercion any time one’s right is threatened:  
 
“If a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws 
(i.e., wrong), coercion that is opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom) is consistent with 
freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, it is right. Hence there is connected with right by the 
principle of contradiction an authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon it”.25 
 
Now, given the close connection between right and coercion, it is only logical 
that Kant makes the completion of right dependent on the exit of the state of nature and 
entrance into a civil state. It is not that he does not acknowledge the existence of right 
in the natural state. On the contrary: he says quite clearly that in the state of nature it is 
already possible to speak of possession, and, therefore, of “mine” and “yours”.26 
However, this kind of right would be merely private
27
 and provisional: in order to 
totally secure those possessions it is necessary to exit the state of nature and create a 
civil constitution.
28
 This is why the creation of a civil constitution becomes a duty.
29
 
This is true not merely for justice that holds among persons in their exchanges with one 
another (iustitia commutativa), but also for distributive justice.
30
 In both cases, a 
transition from private to public right is morally necessary.
31
 
                                                 
21 And thus Kant speaks of a duty to acquire culture. MM, 6: 392. 
22 See SBHH. 
23 MM, 6: 230. See also TP, 8: 290.  
24 MM, 6: 230. “So act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance 
with a universal law”. MM, 6: 231. 
25 MM, 6: 231. 
26 See Robert Pippin,  Mine and Thine: the Kantian State, in: The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. P. Guyer, 2006, 
416-446.  
27 “The highest division of natural right cannot be the division (sometimes made) into natural and social right; it must 
instead be the division into natural and civil right, the former of which is called private right, and the latter public right. 
For a state of nature is not opposed to a social but to a civil condition, since there can certainly be society in a state of 
nature, but not civil society (which secures what is mine or yours by public laws). This is why right in a state of nature is 
called private right”. MM, 6:242. See also 6:306. 
28 See MM, 6: 257. 
29 MM, 6:264. 
30 MM, 6: 297. 
31 “Right is the limitation of each person’s freedom so that it is compatible with the freedom of everyone, insofar as this is 
possible in accord with a universal law; and public right is the totality (Inbegriff) of external laws that makes such a 
thoroughgoing compatibility possible. Now, since every limitation of freedom by the will (Willkür) of another is called 
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Now, public right is defined by Kant as “a system of laws for a people, that is, a 
multitude of human beings, or for a multitude of peoples, which, because they affect 
one another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting them, a constitution 
(constitutio), so that they may enjoy what is laid down as right”.32 
 
The distinction between “a multitude of human beings” and “a multitude of 
peoples”, in turn, is the basis for a distinction within Public Right itself, namely that 
between the Right of a State and the Right of Nations, which “lead inevitably to the 
idea of a right for all nations (ius gentium) or cosmopolitan right (ius 
cosmopoliticum)”.33 
 
According to Kant, whereas the Right of Nations treats Nations as if they were in 
the state of nature –and therefore in a state of war-, the Cosmopolitan Right puts 
forward an ideal: that of a federation of nations aiming at perpetual peace,
34
 because 
perpetual peace is “the highest political good”.35 Indeed,Kant holds the latter not to be a 
merely “philanthropic (ethical principle) but a principle having to do with rights”.36 
Moreover, in Kant’s view, “establishing universal and lasting peace constitutes not 
merely a part of the doctrine of right but rather the entire final end of the doctrine of 
right within the limits of reason alone; for the condition of peace is the only condition 
in which what is mine and what is yours are secured under laws for a multitude of 
human beings living in proximity to one another and therefore under a constitution”.37  
 
The final end of the Doctrine of Right is establishing universal and lasting peace. 
Why is this so? As we have just read, Kant holds peace to be the condition under which 
everybody’s right is finally secured. In the Metaphysics of Morals, this final end –the 
highest political good- is something to be achieved through human agency insofar as it 
advances the juridical institutions necessary to warrant peace.  
 
Yet in other contexts, Kant takes a less practical and more naturalistic approach to 
the highest political good. Thus, instead of stressing the duty to advance juridical 
institutions, he simply argues that nature itself makes its way through the unsocial 
sociability of human beings, to further the advancement of those very institutions, even 
if men themselves do not act in a properly moral way, but only pragmatically.  
 
Without explicitly rejecting the possibility of advancing those ends through 
righteous behavior, Kant’s writings on the philosophy of history seem to indicate that 
                                                                                                                                                    
coercion, it follows that the civil constitution is a relation among free men (notwithstanding their complete freedom in 
uniting with others) who yet stand under coercive laws, for reason itself –indeed, pure a priori law-giving reason, which 
takes no notice of any empirical ends (which can all be grasped under the general name of happiness)- wills it so”.  MM, 
6: 306-308. See also TP, 8:290. 
31 MM, 6: 230. 
32 MM, 6: 311. 
33 MM, 6: 311. 
34 MM, 6: 344-345. 
35 MM, 6: 355. 
36 MM, 6: 352. 
37 MM, 6: 355. Yet this goal should not be realized “by way of revolution, but rather “carried out by gradual reform in 
accordance with firm principles” 
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he sees reasons for hope in moral progress despite all of men’s wrongdoings. 
Accordingly, he appeals not so much to duty as to pragmatic intelligence: it would be in 
man’s own interest to advance those juridical institutions.  
 
While it is certainly surprising that institutions aimed to regulate man’s external 
freedom can have their origin merely in a combination of nature and pragmatic 
intelligence, I would like to point out that Kant’s naturalistic account of the origin of 
right, is coherent with his general account of right as necessarily involving coercion, if 
only we assume that in this case we would be coerced not by law –since, at the origin of 
the institution of right there is no civil state to coerce- but by nature itself.  
 
Yet, arriving at a juridical state, and so at a state of external freedom, does not 
entail arriving at a properly moral culture. As Kant himself observes in the 
Anthropology, “in the civil constitution of a state, which represents the highest degree 
of artificial enhancement of the good characteristics in the human species toward final 
purpose of its destiny, animality still manifests itself earlier and basically stronger than 
pure humanity… Man’s own will is always ready to turn hostile toward his neighbor. 
He never fails to press his claim to an unconditional freedom; he does not merely want 
to be independent, but he even wants mastery over others who are equal to him by 
nature”.38 
 
Civilization per se does not secure morality. The animal in us is always ready to 
wake up, ready to turn hostile towards his neighbor. To the extent that external freedom 
is all we can get through the process of civilization, civilization is plainly not enough to 
foster a true culture of freedom. Even if human beings have managed to create the 
appropriate juridical institutions, they would still be in need of morality, in order to 
renounce unjust domination on one another. We could say, then, that beyond the 
highest political good –perpetual peace- we are still in search of the highest good which 
can only be the effect of a moral culture.   
 
 
III. Kant’s moral culture 
  
In speaking of “moral culture”, Kant points at a behavior based on maxims rather than 
on discipline. This sort of behavior cannot possibly arise from nature, for its origin and 
its ground of determination lies solely in reason.
39
 So the “institution” of a moral 
culture cannot be expected to arise merely from historical progress. In fact, what Kant 
has to say about moral education does not look at first very promising:  
 
“Since good men, who must themselves have been trained for it, are required for moral education, 
and since there is probably not one among them who has no (innate or acquired) depravity himself, the 
problem of moral education for our species remains unsolved. It remains unsolved not only with regard 
to the degree, but even as to the quality of the principle, because an innate, evil tendency in our species 
                                                 
38 Anth., 7: 327. 
39 “This tendency can be observed in the smallest child because in him, starting from culture toward morality and its laws, 
Nature strives to establish a culture which conforms with morality. This inevitably establishes the wrong tendency which 
does not answer the purpose. For example, one would try in vain to deduct morality if religious instruction, which should 
necessarily be a moral cultivation, starts with the historical, which is only memory training”. Anth., 7: 328. 
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may be censured by common human reason, and at best also be controlled, but it will thereby still not 
have been extinguished”.40 
 
With those words Kant is pointing at a similar problem he had already noted in 
his Idea for a Universal History: the problem of government, which Kant takes to be 
the “hardest and the last to be solved by the human species”,  
 
“For he certainly abuses his freedom in relation to his equals, and although as a rational creature 
he desires a law that establishes boundaries for everyone’s freedom, his selfish animal propensities 
induce him to except himself from them wherever he can. He thus requires a master who will break his 
self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will, whereby everyone can be free”.41 
 
According to this text, the reason why man needs both an educator and a master is 
because his animal nature opposes his rational nature. While this could lead us to think 
that the ideal fulfillment of a moral culture should involve the overcoming of this 
opposition, we should observe that this way of thinking about “moral culture” involves 
a sort of paradox. This paradox arises because, in Kant’s view, human morality is 
defined by the conflict between nature and reason.
42
 Nevertheless, at some places Kant 
points at this ideal, especially when he suggests the idea of a “return to nature” or a 
“second nature”.43  
 
Yet, the contrast between nature and reason should not be too rapidly equated 
with the struggle between the good and the evil principle in us. According to Kant, 
nature is not evil of itself. Radical evil cannot be identified with it. Since the biggest 
obstacle to the advancement of education comes from the radical evil in us, we must 
turn our attention not so much to the ideal of a second nature as to how we overcome 
evil. From this perspective, the only way to speak of a moral culture would be to 
engage in the moral philosophy he develops in his book on Religion, particularly when 
he speaks of the conditions for the establishment of an “ethical commonwealth”.  
 
III. 1. Moral culture as second nature (or return to nature) 
 
One of the places where Kant most clearly suggests the idea of morality becoming 
nature is at the end of the final part of his small essay Speculative Beginnings of Human 
                                                 
40 Anth., 7: 327. 
41 Idea, 8:23. “There are two human inventions which may be considered more difficult than any others –the art of 
government, and the art of education; and people still contend as to their very meaning”. Education (12); 9: 446. 
42 “The very concept of duty is already the concept of a necessitation (constraint) of free choice through the law. This 
constraint may be external constraint or a self-constraint. The moral imperative makes this constraint known through the 
categorical nature of its pronouncement (the unconditional ought). Such constraint, therefore, does not apply to rational 
beings as such (there could also be holy ones) but rather to human beings, rational natural beings, who are unholy enough 
that pleasure can induce them to break the moral law”. MM, 6: 379. 
43 Kant himself speaks of art which becomes nature again (Kunst wieder Natur wird). In the English translation it is used 
the expression “second nature”. The problem with this expression is twofold: a)  on the one hand, Kant himself uses this 
expression in the Critique of Judgment, in a different context, to describe morality, as a second –supersensible- nature: 
“Simplicity (artless purposiveness) is as it were the style of nature in the sublime, and so also of morality, which is a 
second (supersensible) nature, of which we know only the laws, without being able by intuition to reach the supersensible 
faculty in ourselves that contains the ground of this legislation”. KU, 5:275. b) In the English translations the expression 
“second nature” is also used to translate ideas other than “return to nature” or morality as a supersensible nature. In these 
cases what the translations report as second nature is nothing other than habituation or prejudice: See, Anth., 7: 121; 
Anth., 7: 312.  
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History. Kant has just given his own account of Rousseau’s contraposition of nature 
and culture, as well as what he takes to be Rousseau’s main concern: “how must culture 
progress so as to develop the capacities belonging to mankind’s vocation as a moral 
species and thus end the conflict within himself as (a member of both a) moral species 
and a natural species?”. 
 
Kant himself was concerned with this problem. In this interesting essay he goes 
on to observe that the conflict between man as a cultural being and natural being is the 
origin of “all true evil that oppresses human life and vice that dishonours it”. Indeed: 
natural capacities –he says- are good and serve a purpose; as such they are not to be 
regarded as the origin of evil.  Yet, “they will conflict with culture as it proceeds, just 
as it will conflict with them until art so perfects itself as to be a second nature, which is 
the final goal of human species’ moral vocation”.44 
 
According to this text, we could think of an end to that conflict, namely, when art 
–that is, culture-, so perfects itself that it becomes a second nature. Likewise, in the 
Education he writes: “Vices, for the most part, arise in this way, that civilization does 
violence to Nature; and yet, our destiny as human beings is to emerge from our natural 
state as animals. Perfect art becomes second nature”.45 
 
In both cases Kant speaks of art, or culture, as perfecting itself, until it becomes 
nature again.  Now, how are we supposed to understand this “perfecting itself” of 
culture? Shortly before this passage, Kant makes a brief reference to the imperfection 
of present culture. He says: “culture founded on true principles for the education of men 
and citizens has not even properly made a beginning, much less been completed”.46 
 
In Kant’s view, the true principles upon which culture should begin are rational, 
moral principles, and not simply nature
47
 or mores
48
: otherwise it is very difficult to 
adjust one another. In saying that culture should begin by reason, Kant does not mean 
that moral training must begin first in time, but rather that “it must be taken into 
account from the beginning, at the same time with physical training”.49 Yet, in his view, 
this entails already a revolution in Education, for, “with education is involved the great 
secret of the perfection of human nature” .50 
 
Kant himself thought that his Enlightened times were the first in producing the 
necessary conditions for making a new start in this field: a new start which would lead 
the human race to the achievement of its moral destiny: “It is only now that something 
                                                 
44 SBHH, 8: 117-8.  
45 Education (102), 9: 492. 
46 SBHH, 8: 117 
47 See Anth., 7: 328. 
48 “Human being’s moral education must begin not with an improvement of mores, but with the transformation of mind 
and the establishment of a character, although it is customary to proceed otherwise and to fight vices individually, while 
leaving their universal root undisturbed”. Religion, 6: 48. 
49 Education (33), 9:455. 
50 Education (7), 9: 443. 
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may be done in this direction, since for the first time people have begun to judge 
rightly, and understand clearly, what actually belongs to a good education”. 51  
 
His idea of the goal of education, as it was said above, has mostly to do with the 
internalization of the moral principles so that they become a sort of second nature.
52
 
Kant envisions a completely different world, for the time when human beings become 
acquainted with those principles: 
 
“It is delightful to realise that through education human nature will be continually 
improved, and brought to such a condition as is worthy of the nature of man. This 
opens out to us the prospect of a happier human race in the future”.53 
 
However, in Kant’s view, this optimistic prospect could never possibly be the 
work of any individual human being: it must rather be the work of the whole human 
race
54, an art to be perfected “through the practice of many generations”,55 because the 
transmission of knowledge and insight from one generation to another is very slow.
56
  
 
In those words Kant seems fully confident in the progress of mankind.
57
 Other 
times he shows more skepticism.
58
 In either case, however, it is important to notice that 
expressing this hope in terms of a “return to nature” involves much more than speaking 
of morality as a second (supersensible) nature. Indeed, while the moral law can be 
called the archetypal world, which we cognize only in reason, the idea of a return to 
nature suggests a complete realization in the sensible nature, of the moral law. From 
this perspective, it can be related to the notion of a “natura ectypa”, developed by Kant 
in the Second Critique.      
 
This notion is perfectly in line with what Kant says in the KpV, ideally, that the 
moral law or the law of freedom should be able to “furnish the sensible world, as a 
                                                 
51 Education (7), 9: 443. 
52 “Under the present educational system man does not fully attain to the object of his being; for in what various ways men 
live! Uniformity can only result when all men act according to the same principles, which principles would make to 
become with them a second nature”. Education  (9); 9: 445. 
53 Education (7), 9: 444. 
54 Education (10), 9: 445. 
55 Education (11), 9: 446. 
56 Moreover, “if … the children are to progress beyond their parents, education must become a study… the mechanism of 
education must be changed into a science”, Education, (14), 9: 447. Now, one of the principles to keep in mind in this new 
scheme of things is that “children ought to be educated not for the present, but for a possibly improved condition of man 
in the future; that is, in a manner which is adapted to the idea of humanity and the whole destiny of man” (15), 9: 447. 
Accordingly, education must be entrusted to “enlightened experts” (17), 9: 449. 
57 “In the natural progress of the human race, talents, skills, and tastes (along with its result, voluptuousness) become 
cultured before morality develops, and this state is precisely the most burdensome and dangerous possible for morality, as 
well as for physical well-beings, for needs grow much more vigorously than do the means to satisfy them. However, 
humanity’s moral capacity, which always lags behind, will someday overtake them (as one may hope to occur under a 
wise world ruler), though in its hasty course it becomes tangled in itself and often stumbles”. End of All Things, 8: 332. 
58 “If we now inquire as to the means by which this eternal progress towards betterment can be maintained and perhaps 
even sped up, one soon sees that this immeasurably distant result depends not so much on what we do (e.g. on the 
education we give the world’s children), nor on what method we adopt so as to bring it about; instead, it depends on what 
human nature does in and with us so as to compel us onto a path that we ourselves would not readily follow. Only from 
nature, or rather only from providence (since supreme wisdom is required for the fulfillment of this end), can we 
anticipate a result that will affect the whole and, as a consequence, the parts”. TP, 8: 310. 
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sensible nature (in what concerns rational beings), with the form of a world of the 
understanding, that is, of a supersensible nature, though without infringing upon the 
mechanism of the former”,59 i.e., in a way compatible with this mechanism. What Kant 
calls “natura ectypa” contains the possible effect of the idea of the moral law as the 
determining ground of the will.
60
 
 
Accordingly, the natura ectypa is not simply the sensible nature, but, rather, the 
way in which the intelligible nature is present in the sensible nature. So, Kant is 
assuming the law that forms the natura archetypa as a sort of causal law, able to 
produce a proportionate effect in the sensible nature, which constitutes in turn the 
natura ectypa.
61
   
 
From this perspective, the whole point of speaking of a “return to nature” would 
be to highlight the ideal of a second, moralized nature, in which the moral law would 
not conflict with historical culture (or nature). To a certain extent this is a radical way 
of expressing the ideal of a harmony between nature and morality that makes up the 
notion of a highest good.  
 
Yet, just as the highest good itself, moral culture so understood –as moralized 
nature- is more an ideal than anything else. On the one hand, because, as it was pointed 
out above, Kant’s own moral psychology does not leave much room for such a 
harmony between nature and reason. 
 
But there is a further, more fundamental reason to regard this moral culture as an 
ideal; this reason is that “the moral law in fact transfers us, in idea, into a nature in 
which pure reason, if it were accompanied with suitable physical power, would produce 
the highest good, and it determines our will to confer on the sensible world the form of 
a whole of rational beings”.62  
 
The conditional clause, however, is meant to mark a limit to the realization of this 
ideal. It seems, indeed, as if the moral law of itself would be enough to realize the 
highest good in the sensible world –a natura ectypa, provided that it were accompanied 
with “suitable physical power”, but it is not. What the text suggests, then, is that the 
impossibility of realizing the highest good in this world is due mainly to the lack of 
physical power to implement the idea of the natura archetypa.  
 
This thought is similar to another one conveyed in the KrV, except for a 
significant difference. In the KrV, the hindrances to the realization of the highest good 
arise not so much from the lack of physical power proportioned to morality, but from 
the fact that, once in the real world, not everyone acts according to the moral law, and –
                                                 
59 KpV, 5: 43. 
60 KpV, 5: 43. 
61 See also: “According to the law, each and every human being should furnish in his own self an example of this idea. 
And the required prototype always resides only in reason, since outer experience yields no example adequate to this idea”. 
Religion, 6: 63. 
62 KpV, 5: 43. 
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we presume- not just because of “lack of physical power”, unless we take this “lack of 
physical power” in a broad sense, as not being able to overcome the inclinations: 
 
“In an intelligible world, i.e., in the moral world, in the concept of which we have abstracted from 
all hindrances to morality (of the inclinations), such a system proportionately combined with morality 
can also be thought as necessary, since freedom, partly moved and partly restricted by moral laws, would 
itself be the cause of the general happiness, and rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, 
would themselves be the authors of their own enduring welfare and at the same time that of the others. 
But this system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the realization of which rests on the condition 
that everyone do what he should, i.e., that all actions of rational beings occur as if they arose from a 
highest will that comprehends all private choice in or under itself”.63 
 
According to this text, the intelligible world is identical with the moral world 
without inclinations, and this is thought as “naturally” conducive to the highest good –
where the word “naturally” stands for the natural effect of a system of self-rewarding 
morality.
64
  
 
By contrast, Kant stresses in the KpV that even in a perfect moral world –in the 
natura ectypa-, to the extent that it is a sensible world, an intrinsic harmony between 
the moral-intelligible world and the natural-sensible world would still be missing,
65
 
unless physical power proportionate to the moral law were present.  In other words, to 
the extent that the moral law must be realized in a sensible world, no happiness flowing 
“naturally” from morality can be expected because there are insurmountable hindrances 
deriving from the fact that sensible nature is subject to a different law. This law, 
however, is not merely the mechanic law, which, as such, could never oppose morality, 
for they are in different realms. The insurmountable hindrance Kant has in mind is the 
fact that we are beings with particular inclinations, which constitute a “natural whole” 
concurrent with the legislation arisen from pure practical laws: 
 
“In actual nature, insofar as it is an object of experience, the free will is not of itself determined to 
such maxims as could of themselves establish a nature in accordance with universal laws, or even to such 
maxims as could of themselves fit into a nature arranged in accordance with them; they are, instead, 
private inclinations which do constitute a natural whole in accordance with pathological (physical) laws 
but not a nature that would be possible only through our will in accordance with pure practical laws”.66 
 
                                                 
63 KrV, A 811/B839. 
64 Andrews Reath has stressed that in the KrV Kant seems to consider the possibility of the highest good as emerging from 
a system of self-rewarding morality.  This account of the highest good would not require to introduce the idea of God as a 
condition for its possibility. In a moral world where people would behave morally, freedom would be moved only by 
moral laws, and as a consequence, everyone would act morally and promote the other’s happiness, so that rational beings 
would be the authors of their own welfare. See Andrews Reath,  Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant, Journal 
of the History of Philosophy, 1988, 593-619. 
65 Something which, according to the KrV, would make room for a hope which has its ground neither in nature nor in the 
causality of actions, but in a highest reason alone: “Since the obligation from the moral law remains valid for each 
particular use of freedom even if others do not conduct themselves in accord with this law, how their consequences will be 
related to happiness is determined neither by the nature of the things in the world, nor by the causality of actions 
themselves and their relation to morality; and the necessary connection of the hope of being happy with the unremitting 
effort to make oneself worthy of happiness that has been adduced cannot be cognized through reason if it is grounded 
merely in nature, but may be hoped for only if it is at the same time grounded on a highest reason, which commands in 
accordance with moral laws, as at the same time the cause of nature”. KrV, A 811/B839. 
66 KpV, 5: 44. 
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Stated in this way, the moral deficiency hindering the implementation of the 
highest good would indeed be rooted in the fact that our will is not determined 
“necessarily” to maxims according to universal laws, but, instead, many of them arise 
from private inclinations. This is what happens in “actual nature”, as opposed to the 
“intelligible world” or “natura archetypa”, where abstraction is made of every 
particular inclination. Yet, the interesting point here is that, it is not particular 
inclinations as such, but the natural whole they constitute according to physical laws, 
that hinders morality. This “natural whole” is to be clearly distinguished from that 
“nature that would be possible only through our will in accordance with practical laws”. 
 
In view of this, it is apparent that the word “nature” is used here in two different 
ways. The “physical laws” which constitute a “natural whole” are of a different kind 
than the “Law of Nature”, which represents a reference even for the Moral Law. The 
former takes its form from the Understanding, and is to be understood as type or symbol 
of the Moral Law; the other is an ideal shaped by the Imagination, which unifies the 
objects of the inclinations under the idea of happiness,
67
 or –which is the same: the 
principle of self-love.
68
 The crucial point is that it is not inclinations as such –which 
according to Kant are to be held as good
69
-, but the “natural whole” that they constitute 
which hinders morality.
70
 And this is because the “natural whole” cannot, according to 
Kant, be subordinated to the Moral Law. 
 
We come to see, also at a practical level, the relevance of Imagination in Kant’s 
philosophy. It is evident that the Law of Nature, which holds as a causal law for every 
natural being, holds also for humans. But in humans it generates a different logic which 
is not merely mechanic. Happiness cannot be explained in a mechanical way. It is an 
ideal, but not an ideal of reason, but of imagination. 
 
While the longing for happiness is deeply rooted in our sensible nature, it is also 
responsible for the opposition that this very nature offers to morality. As a possible 
ground for decisions that depart from the moral law, it furnishes the concept of “radical 
evil” –so called because it corrupts the ground of all maxims.71 However, insofar as the 
                                                 
67 “For happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination, resting merely upon empirical grounds, which it is futile to 
expect should determine an action by which the totality of a series of results in fact infinite would be attained”.  GG, 4: 
418. 
68 “All material practical principles as such are, without exception, of one and the same kind and come under the general 
principle of self-love or one’s happiness”. KpV, 5: 22. 
69 “The ground of this evil cannot be placed, as is so commonly done, in man’s sensuous nature and the natural 
inclinations arising therefrom. For not only are these not directly related to evil (rather do they afford the occasion for 
what the moral disposition in its power can manifest, namely, virtue); we must not even be considered responsible for 
their existence (we cannot be, for since they are implanted in us we are not their authors)”. Religion, 6: 34. 
70 “The distinction between a good man and one who is evil cannot lie in the difference between the incentives which they 
adopt into their maxim (not in the content of the maxim), but rather must depend upon subordination (the form of the 
maxim), i.e., which of the two incentives he makes the condition of the other. Consequently man (even the best) is evil 
only in that he reverses the moral order of the incentives when he adopts them into his maxim. He adopts, indeed, the 
moral law along with the law of self-love; yet when he becomes aware that they cannot remain on a par with each other 
but that one must be subordinated to the other as its supreme condition, he makes the incentive of self-love and its 
inclinations the condition of obedience to the moral law; whereas, on the contrary, the latter, as the supreme condition of 
the satisfaction of the former, ought to have been adopted into the universal maxim of the will as the sole incentive”. 
Religion, 6: 36. 
71 Religion, 6: 36. “The rational origin of this perversion of our will whereby it makes lower incentives supreme among its 
maxims, that is, of the propensity to evil, remains inscrutable to us, because this propensity itself must be set down to our 
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desire for happiness is rooted in our finite nature, Kant will be willing to unite both 
ideas –morality and happiness, under the moral ideal of the “highest good”. The main 
obstacle to its realization does not come from nature, but rather from the presence of an 
evil principle in man, which leads us to subvert the grounds of determination of our 
will. Hence, if the idea of a “moral culture” is to have some meaning at all, this cannot 
be linked to the overcoming of the difference between nature and reason, but rather to 
the victory of the good principle over the evil one.   
 
 
III. 2. Moral culture as the ethical commonwealth 
 
The overcoming of the evil principle is the theme of Kant’s Religion within the 
boundaries of reason alone. Its second book begins with a simple observation: “To 
become a morally good human being it is not enough simply to let the germ of the good 
which lies in our species develop unhindered; there is in us an active and opposing 
cause of evil which is also to be combated”.72  
 
In Kant’s view, natural inclinations are good; we must not extirpate them, but 
rather discipline them and prudently harmonize them into a whole called happiness. It 
is true that inclinations, left to their own, can make difficult the execution of good 
maxims opposed to them; but genuine evil consists in not willing to resist the 
inclinations when they invite to transgressions.
73
 Accordingly, the enemy “is not to be 
sought in the natural inclinations, which merely lack discipline and openly display 
themselves unconcealed to everyone’s consciousness, but is rather as it were an 
invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason and hence all the more dangerous”.74  
 
What we have to eradicate, then, are not the inclinations, but rather the unlawful, 
since this alone is evil in itself. Its origin, says Kant, is  
 
“a corruption that lies in all human beings and cannot be overcome except through the idea of the 
moral good in its absolute purity, combined with the consciousness that this idea belongs to our original 
predisposition and we only need to be assiduous in keeping it free of any impure mixture, and to accept it 
deeply in our disposition, to become convinced by the gradual influence that it has on the mind that the 
dreaded powers of evil have nothing to muster against it”.75 
 
This, however, involves a struggle: the struggle between the good and the evil 
principle in us. Victory in this struggle is what definitely brings “freedom from the 
dominion of evil”, that is, internal freedom: “the highest prize that he can win”.76 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
account and because, as a result, that ultimate ground of all maxims would in turn involve the adoption of an evil maxim 
(as its basis). Evil could have sprung only from the morally evil (not from mere limitations in our nature); and yet the 
original predisposition is a predisposition to good; there is then for us no conceivable ground from which the moral evil in 
us could originally have come”. Religion, 6: 43. 
72 Religion, 6: 57. 
73 See Religion, 6: 58, footnote. 
74 Religion, 6: 57. 
75 Religion, 6: 83. 
76 Religion, 6: 93. 
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Yet, individual struggle is not enough to overcome the threats that the human 
beings face in their natural state. According to Kant, there is no possibility of 
overcoming the effect of the evil principle in us as long as we fight in isolation. Instead, 
we must enter into an ethical community. The reason for this is that the threat to the 
good principle arose because of society with other human beings in the first place:  
 
“It is not the instigation of nature that arouses what should properly be called the passions, which 
wreak such great devastation in his originally good predisposition. (…) Envy, addiction to power, 
avarice, and the malignant inclinations associated with these, assail his nature, which on its own is 
undemanding, as soon as he is among human beings”.77 
 
Unlike inclinations, or even emotions, “passions” have always a negative 
connotation for Kant,
78
 and passions do not arise merely because of the instigation of 
nature, but rather because of the influence of society. For it is only in society that man 
begins to compare himself with others and gets anxious that “other human beings will 
consider him poor and will despise for it”.79 There is no need to invoke the eventual 
evil examples of others, “it suffices that they are there, that they surround him, and that 
they are human beings, and they will mutually corrupt each other’s moral disposition 
and make one another evil”.80 
 
This is why, in order to counteract the evil influence of society, human beings 
have to enter into another kind of society, living according the laws of virtue: 
“Inasmuch as we can see… the dominion of the good principle is not otherwise 
attainable, so far as human beings can work toward it, than through the setting up and 
the diffusion of as society in accordance with, and for the sake of, the laws of virtue”.81 
 
Accordingly, Kant regards the establishment of this ethical society as a duty of 
the entire human race, “for only in this way can we hope for a victory of the good 
principle over the evil one”.82 To the extent that the laws of this society –the laws of 
virtue- are public, it can be called an “ethico-civil society” or “ethical community”. 
Thus, Kant traces an analogy to the juridical society: both societies would be the result 
of a pact, whereby men would abandon a former state of nature –either a juridical state 
of nature or an ethical state of nature.
83
 While the juridical society would be the means 
to overcome social conflict and wars, the ethical community would be the means to 
overcome the evil principle in us.  
 
Several particularities should be noted in this regard: first, the ethical community 
could exist in the midst of the political one, but, in Kant’s view, the latter must take 
                                                 
77 Religion, 6: 93. 
78 “Beyond inclination there is finally a further stage in the faculty of desire, passion (not emotion, for this has to do with 
the feeling of pleasure and pain), which is an inclination that excludes the mastery over oneself”. Religion, I, 1, footnote. 
See also KU, 5: 272 and MM, 6: 408 
79 Religion, 6: 93. 
80 Religion, 6: 94. 
81 Religion, 6: 94. 
82 Religion, 6: 94. “The idea of such a state has an entirely well-grounded, objective reality in human reason (in the duty 
to join such a state), even though we cannot subjectively ever hope of the good will of human beings that these will work 
harmoniously toward this end”. Religion, 6: 95. 
83 Religion, 6: 95. 
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precedence over the former
84
; second, unlike the political community, the ethical 
community could ideally comprise the entire human race;
85
 third, while the laws of the 
juridical society are public juridical laws, the laws of an ethical community are laws of 
virtue alone. Consequently, the first can be enforced, but the second cannot. Thus, 
while one could be obliged to enter into the social contract which supports the culture 
of right, the sole idea of being obliged to enter into the social contract which defines the 
ethical commonwealth involves a contradiction, “since the latter entails freedom from 
coercion in its very concept”.86  
 
Indeed, the absence of coercion is involved in the very notion of ethical duties.
87
  
Accordingly, while the abandonment of an ethical state of nature and an entrance into 
an ethical community must be regarded as an ethical duty,
88
 it is still true that one could 
only enter into this community through an act of his freedom.   
 
This duty is special for two reasons: first, it is not a duty merely “of human 
beings toward human beings, but of the human race toward itself”;89 second, this is a 
very particular duty, because it commands the realization of an ideal, which we don’t 
know we, as a whole, are able to realize. 
 
Indeed, the achievement of the highest moral good depends not merely upon 
every individual person striving solely for his or her own moral perfection, “but 
requires rather a union of such persons into a whole toward that very end, i.e. toward a 
system of well-disposed human beings in which, and through the unity of which alone, 
the highest moral good can come to pass”;90 Kant describes the goal of this duty as the 
realization of a “universal republic based on the laws of virtue”, and takes it to be an 
ideal “of which we cannot know whether as a whole it is also in our power”. This is 
why this duty is completely different “from all others in kind and in principle”.91 
 
Indeed, unlike the highest political good, which we can think as possible through 
the combination of the mechanism of nature and our pragmatic intelligence, the 
attainment of the highest ethical good depends essentially on the good will of men, and, 
“we cannot subjectively ever hope of the good will of human beings that these will 
work harmoniously toward this end”.92  
 
Accordingly, the hope in the arising of an ethical community depends in a 
qualitatively different way on the presupposition of another idea, namely, the idea “of a 
                                                 
84 “Without the foundation of a political community, it (the ethical community) could never be brought into existence by 
human beings”. Religion, 6: 94. 
85 “Since the duties of virtue concern the entire human race, the concept of an ethical community always refers to the ideal 
of a totality of human beings, and in this it distinguishes itself from the concept of a political community”. Religion, 6: 96. 
86 Religion, 6: 95. 
87 See MM, 6: 381. 
88 “Just as the juridical state of nature is a state of war of every human being against every other, so too is the ethical state 
of nature one in which the good principle, which resides in each human being, is incessantly attacked by the evil which is 
found in him and in every other as well”. Religion, 6: 97. 
89 Religion, 6: 97. 
90 Religion, 6: 97. 
91 Religion, 6: 98. 
92 Religion, 6: 95. 
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higher moral being through whose universal organization the forces of single 
individuals, insufficient on their own, are united for a common effect”.93  
 
Indeed, although this higher moral being –God- was already presupposed since 
Kant first spoke of the Highest Good in KrV and KpV, as long as we remain in the 
realm of the political highest good, that is, in the realm of a culture of right, the role of 
God, from an objective point of view, could largely be played by nature alone. In the 
case of the ethical community, however, the role of God cannot be reduced to a 
subjective idea: there is no way to think of the establishment of the ethical community 
other than by attributing God the role of organizing the forces of single individuals to 
this end. A mechanical nature could never produce this effect. “Hence an ethical 
community is conceivable only as a people under divine commands, i.e., as a people of 
God, and indeed in accordance with the laws of virtue”.94  
  
 
IV. Understanding Kant’s culture of freedom 
 
 
While external freedom can be ensured by a “culture of right”, made up by juridical 
institutions –specifically by the civil state-, internal freedom can only be achieved in 
the context of a moral culture, defined by the law of virtue shared by a community of 
human beings. Accordingly, civil state and ethical community are the two aspects of a 
culture of freedom. Now, in order to work out the idea of a “complete” culture of 
freedom, it seems fit to ask how both aspects relate to each other.   
 
Although Kant says that the ethical community can develop within the civil state, 
he also says that the civil state –the juridical community- must precede the 
establishment of the ethical community. Yet, at the same time, the establishment of the 
juridical community is not merely a duty of right, but also a moral duty. This could be 
seen as circular: we have the moral duty to establish a civil state, but the civil state, in 
turn, seems to be a pre-condition for defeating the evil principle in us. 
 
This dilemma can be avoided by Kant to the extent that he leaves room for a 
naturalistic development of a culture of right. Men do not merely have moral reasons to 
establish a civil state: they have also pragmatic self-interested reasons. And, according 
to Kant, the combination of nature and pragmatic intelligence would suffice to generate 
a civil state, and, even, to a certain extent, Cosmopolitan Right.  
 
The establishment of the civil state and cosmopolitan right would provide us with 
a state of peace necessary to develop a moral community. Yet, unlike the former, the 
latter cannot be guaranteed by pragmatic reasons and nature. While a civil state could 
be reasonably hoped for even against evidence of man’s wrecked behavior, the arising 
of an ethical commonwealth is entirely a matter of faith, not only from a subjective 
point of view, but also from an objective point of view. For only by assuming the 
                                                 
93 Religion, 6: 98. 
94 Religion, 6: 99. 
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intervention of God could the moral community be finally established and the evil 
principle controlled. 
 
Accordingly, while we would have reasons to expect the realization of the highest 
political good –perpetual peace as the absence of war- the realization of the highest 
good would ultimately depend on faith in God, for while the highest good is defined in 
terms of “happiness proportioned to morality”, the possibility of morality itself depends 
on the establishment of the moral community, and this, in turn, depends on faith in 
God.
95
 This is Kant’s way to introduce the concept of “Church”, which he essentially 
defines in terms of an “ethical community”.  
 
From his perspective, historical Religions and Churches have merely the mission 
of paving the way for moral religion and the ethical community.  Yet, what interests us 
here is noting that, according to him, internal freedom is linked to this moral 
community, which, in his view, could grow and embrace the different political 
communities. It is precisely at this point, where external freedom –depending on 
juridical institutions- and internal freedom –depending on faith in God and community 
of virtue- could finally meet each other. It seems to me that this is Kant’s way of 
reconciling external freedom and internal freedom: the only way, therefore, to create a 
complete “culture of freedom”.  
 
It is true that considered from our perspective, this solution raises some problems, 
the most salient being that it makes the culture of freedom dependent on the elimination 
of historical-cultural differences. In fact, according to Kant, historical religions would 
have merely an educational purpose, and once they fulfilled their role, should be 
abandoned in favor of a single and pure moral religion. More generally, historical and 
cultural differences
96
 are regarded as a major obstacle to the reign of pure reason, and 
should therefore be overcome. Indeed, in Kant’s approach, history and cult are merely 
means for the advancement of reason. They are not –as they will be among the 
romantics- different expressions of humanity.  
 
Of course, to the extent that this universal ethical community is merely an ideal, 
cultural and historical differences are still in place, and, according to Kant, they even 
have a role to play, for instance, in preventing universal despotism. This role, however, 
is a mere pragmatic one. It does not involve a positive appraisal of cultural plurality in 
itself: cultural and historical differences remain something to be overcome. 
 
In the meantime, we have another problem: if the ethical community does not 
grow enough to embrace the political community, human beings are bound to 
experience a kind of alienation: the distance between their internal moral law and actual 
                                                 
95 According to the definition of highest good as “happiness proportioned to morality”, all the happiness we are entitled to 
expect remains limited to the morality we live up to. If we did not consider Kant’s doctrine of radical evil, we could 
interpret this in two different ways: either we assume God as the one who dispenses happiness proportioned to morality, 
or we just think of happiness as a system derived from the system of morality, understood as a self-rewarding system. In 
this case, all the happiness we can expect is that we, following the duty to procure other’s happiness, dispense each other. 
From this perspective God could seem dispensable. Yet, if we take the doctrine of radical evil seriously, we must assume 
that the overcoming of evil requires the establishment of a moral community, and this, in turn, requires faith in God. 
96 Recall Kant’s rejection of any kind of cult. He regards cult in mere instrumental terms: Religion, 6: 13; 127. 
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social life. While they enjoy the external freedom assured by juridical institutions, he 
may have great difficulties to enact his positive freedom. For, on the one hand, the lack 
of a sufficiently strong ethical community leaves one more at the mercy of the evil 
principle; and, on the other, within a culture of merely external freedom it may be 
difficult for them to enact some positive duties of virtue, such as “promoting the other’s 
happiness”. Now, this involves a diminishing in the public –and thereby cultural- 
relevance of internal freedom.  
 
Within Kant’s system, a culture of freedom remains an ideal, but a paradoxical 
one. Its achievement would involve the cessation of history as we know it, and with 
history, the cessation of transitory cultural differences. Yet, as long as humanity has not 
achieved that ideal –and ideals, by definition, are never achieved- the experience of 
freedom will never be complete. Kant’s own system –with his clear-cut distinction 
between external and internal freedom- not merely sets an insurmountable limit to the 
emancipatory program of Enlightenment; in setting those limits, it reminds us once and 
again the real meaning of human finitude. 
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